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LIST OF PARTIES
The following are parties to this appeal:

—

1.

Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross- Appellant Mike Meguerditchian ("Plaintiff);

2.

Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee Max Smith, individually and as Trustee of
the Smith Family Living Trust, u/a/d March 19, 1991 ("Defendant").
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On November 15, 2010, the Utah Court of Appeals received this case via pourover from the Utah Supreme Court. Jurisdiction is proper in this case under Utah Code
Ann. §78A-4-103(2)0).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:

As presented in the Appeal and framed by the Defendant:

"The trial court incorrectly interpreted the holding in Pyper v. Bond, 224
P.3d 713 (Utah App., 2009) in concluding that the only standard for setting
aside the Sheriffs sale is demonstrating both inadequacy of price and
irregularities attending the sale."
Plaintiff argues that the standard applied by the District Court from Pyper v. Bond,
2009 UT App 331, 224 P.3d 713, cert granted, 225 P.3d 880 (Utah 2010), is the
appropriate standard to set aside a sheriffs sale, and that said standard was correctly
found to require both inadequacy of price and irregularities attending the sale.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's

contention that this issue was preserved below in Defendant's closing argument, in
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Sale, and in the
District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 1089, 157:1-9; R. 859-860;
R. 1048,11).
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This issue presents a question of law that is

reviewed for correctness. Pyper v. Bond, 2009 UT App 331 at 19.
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ISSUE II:

As presented in the Appeal and framed by the Defendant:

"The trial court committed error in concluding that there were no
—
irregularities involving the sale of the real properly at the Sheriffs Sale."

~

*

Plaintiff argues that the District Court was correct in finding that there were no
irregularities involving the sale of the real property at the Sheriffs sale. The District
Court found correctly that the Plaintiff was not required to sell personal property of the
Defendant to satisfy his judgment, because insufficient personal property could be found
and the Defendant objected to the sale of personal property, directing that it not be sold,
as set forth more fully hereafter.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

Appellee does not dispute that this issue was

preserved below in the District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R.
1047,H 8).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Defendant alleges that this issue presents a mixed
question of law and fact. This issue appropriately treated as a question of fact, which this
Court reviews "for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight
of the evidence," or if the Court is otherwise able to "reach a firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

ISSUE III; The Subject of the Cross-Appeal:
The sheriffs sale of the Defendant's interest in Water Right #51-224 was set aside
in error by the District Court. The description of that particular water right utilized by the
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Sanpete County Sheriffs office in conducting the Sheriffs sale, as the Defendant's
interest in Water Right # 51-224, was sufficient and as specific as reasonably possible. In
setting aside the sheriffs sale of the Defendant's interest in other unspecified water
rights, the District Court committed error by also setting aside the sale of Water Right #
51-224 that was described with specificity.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

This issue was preserved below in the District

Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 1047 to 1050).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Equitable issues related to setting aside the Sheriffs
sale are generally mixed questions of law and fact. The factual findings of the trial are set
aside if there is clear error, but the appellate court reviews the trial court's legal
conclusions for correctness. "Claims based on equitable doctrines 'are mixed questions
of fact and law.' .... Accordingly, we defer to a trial court's factual findings unless there
is clear error but review its legal conclusions for correctness." Richards v. Brown, 2009
UT App 315,1j 11, 222 P.3d 69, cert, granted, 225 P.3d 880 (Utah 2010) (citations
omitted).
However, the trial court's Order on which the ruling is based is a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. Rule 69B(d), Ut. R. Civ. P., which requires parcels of
real property to be sold separately, does not require that the Defendant's interest in Water
Right #51 -224 be otherwise described or sold. That conclusion of law should be
reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. Matters of statutory interpretation by the
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i
trial court are subject to '"review on appeal for correctness.'" ABCO Enterprises v.
Utah State Tax Com% 2009 UT 36,17, 211 P.3d 382, reh'g denied (June 12, 2009)

—

<

(citations omitted).
i

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule69B(c),Ut.R.Civ.P.:
i

(c) Postponement If the officer finds sufficient cause, the officer may
postpone the sale. The officer shall declare the postponement at the time
and place set for the sale. If the postponement is longer than 72 hours,
notice of the rescheduled sale shall be given in the same manner as the
original notice of sale.
Rule69B(d),Ut.R.Civ.P.:
(d) Conduct of sale. All sales shall be at auction to the highest bidder, Monday
through Saturday, legal holidays excluded, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and
8 o'clock p.m. at a place reasonably convenient to the public. Real property shall
be sold at the district courthouse of the county in which the property is located.
The officer shall sell only so much property as is necessary to satisfy the amount
due. The officer shall not purchase property or be interested in any purchase.
Property capable of delivery shall be within view of those who attend the sale. The
property shall be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price.
Severable lots of real property shall be sold separately. Real property claimed by a
third party shall be sold separately if requested by the third party. The defendant
may direct the order in which the property is sold.
Rule69C,Ut.R.Civ.P.:
RULE 69C REDEMPTION OF REAL PROPERTY AFTER SALE
(a) Right of redemption. Real property may be redeemed unless the estate
is less than a leasehold of a two-years' unexpired term, in which case the sale is
absolute.
(b) Who may redeem. Real property subject to redemption may be
redeemed by the defendant or by a creditor having a lien on the property junior to
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(

that on which the property was sold or by their successors in interest. If the
defendant redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and the defendant is
restored to the defendant's estate. If the property is redeemed by a creditor, any
other creditor having a right of redemption may redeem.
(c) How made. To redeem, the redemptioner shall pay the amount required
to the purchaser and shall serve on the purchaser:
c)(l) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the redemptioner
claims the right to redeem;
(c)(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged if necessary to establish the
claim; and
(c)(3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien.
(d) Time for redemption. The property may be redeemed within 180 days
after the sale.
(e) Redemption price. The price to redeem is the sale price plus six
percent. The price for a subsequent redemption is the redemption price plus three
percent. If the purchaser or redemptioner files with the county recorder notice of
the amounts paid for taxes, assessments, insurance, maintenance, repair or any lien
other than the lien on which the redemption was based, the price to redeem
includes such amounts plus six percent for an initial redemption or three percent
for a subsequent redemption. Failure to file notice of the amounts with the county
recorder waives the right to claim such amounts.
(f) Dispute regarding price. If there is a dispute about the redemption
price, the redemptioner shall within 20 days of the redemption pay into court the
amount necessary for redemption less the amount in dispute and file and serve
upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the items to which the redemptioner
objects and the grounds for the objection. The petition is deemed denied. The court
may permit discovery. The court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing and enter an
order determining the redemption price. The redemptioner shall pay to the clerk
any additional amount within seven days after the court's order.
(g) Certificate of redemption. The purchaser shall promptly execute and
deliver to the redemptioner, or the redemptioner to a subsequent redemptioner, a
certificate of redemption containing:
(g)(1) a detailed description of the real property;
(g)(2) the price paid;
(g)(3) a statement that all right, title, interest of the purchaser in the property
is conveyed to the redemptioner; and
(g)(4) if known, whether the sale is subject to redemption.
The redemptioner or subsequent redemptioner shall file a duplicate of the
certificate with the county recorder.
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(h) Conveyance. The purchaser or last redemptioner is entitled to
conveyance upon the expiration of the time permitted for redemption.
(i) Rents and profits, request for accounting, extension of time for
redemption.
(i)(l) Subject to a superior claim, the purchaser is entitled to the rents of the
property or the value of the use and occupation of the property from the time of
sale until redemption. Subject to a superior claim, a redemptioner is entitled to the
rents of the property or the value of the use and occupation of the property from
the time of redemption until a subsequent redemption. Rents and profits are a
credit upon the redemption price.
(i)(2) Upon written request served on the purchaser before the time for
redemption expires, the purchaser shall prepare and serve on the requester a
written and verified account of rents and profits. The period for redemption is
extended to five days after the accounting is served. If the purchaser fails to serve
the accounting within 30 days after the request, the redemptioner may, within 60
days after the request, bring an action to compel an accounting. The period for
redemption is extended to 15 days after the order of the court.
(j) Remedies.
(j)(l) For waste. A purchaser or redemptioner may file a motion requesting
the court to restrain the commission of waste on the property. After the estate has
become absolute, the purchaser or redemptioner may file an action to recover
damages for waste.
(j)(2) Failure to obtain property.
(j)(2)(A) A purchaser or redemptioner who fails to obtain the property or
who is evicted from the property because the judgment against the defendant is
reversed or discharged may file a motion for judgment against the plaintiff for the
purchase price plus amounts paid for taxes, assessments, insurance, maintenance
and repair plus interest.
(j)(2)(B) A purchaser or redemptioner who fails to obtain the property or
who is evicted from the property because of an irregularity in the sale or because
the property is exempt may file a motion for judgment against the plaintiff or the
defendant for the purchase price plus amounts paid for taxes, assessments,
insurance, maintenance and repair plus interest. If the court enters judgment
against the plaintiff, the court shall revive the plaintiffs judgment against
defendant for the amount of the judgment against plaintiff.
(j)(2)(C) Interest on a judgment in favor of a purchaser or redemptioner is
governed by Utah Code Section 15-1-4. Interest on a revived judgment in favor of
the plaintiff against the defendant is at the rate of the original judgment. The
effective date of a revived judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant is the
date of the original judgment except as to an intervening purchaser in good faith.
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(k) Contribution and reimbursement. A defendant may claim
contribution or reimbursement from other defendants by filing a motion.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P:
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking
to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and
set forth the legal basis for such an award.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

On December 8, 2008, the District Court entered final judgment, pursuant

to Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action, against the Defendant and in favor of the Plaintiff
in the amount of $54,690.92, plus post-judgment interest, attorney's fees and costs. See
the certified record of the District Court (hereinafter "R"), at 609-611.
2.

Seeking satisfaction of that judgment, on March 26, 2009, Plaintiff filed

application for writ of execution, with praecipe, listing personal property, real property
and water rights believed to be held or owned by the Defendant. R. at 617-626.
3.

On April 1, 2009, the writ of execution was issued by the District Court. R.

at 621 to 623.
4.

On June 5, 2009, the Defendant filed a request for hearing and objection to

the writ of execution, claiming that the personal property listed in the writ of execution
was exempt from execution, as tools of the trade. R. at 628-629, a copy of which is
attached in the Addendum hereto under Tab 1.
5.

On June 16, 2009, the Sanpete County Sheriffs Office executed its

Affidavit of Posting of Notice of Sale, together with a copy of said Notice of Sale dated
June 16, 2009, all of which were filed with the District Court on June 17, 2009. R. at
634-636, a copy of which is attached in the Addendum hereto under Tab 2.
6.

Said Notice of Sale scheduled the sheriffs sale for 11:00 a.m. on July 7,

2009. Id.

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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7.

Said Notice of Sale listed four items that would be sold at said sheriffs

sale:

--'a.

:

-—

-

The Defendant's interest in two parcels of real property, being Serial

numbers 20232X1 and 20221, as more particularly described therein. Said parcels
of real property are referred to herein as the "Real Property." Defendant's appeal
to this Court seeks to reverse the District Court's denial of Defendant's motion to
set aside the sale of this Real Property.
b.

The Defendant's interest in Water Right Number 51-224, and other

unspecified water rights of the Defendant in Sanpete County, Utah. Plaintiffs
appeal to this Court seeks to reverse the District Court's grant of Defendant motion
to set aside the sale of Water Right Number 51-224 only, without affecting the
District Court's ruling as to unspecified water rights.
8.

In a status and scheduling conference on June 17, 2009, regarding

Defendant's objection to the writ of execution, Plaintiff informed the Court and the
Defendant that the personal property was not included in the sheriffs notice of sale
because, the Plaintiff had been informed, the sheriff could not locate serial numbers for
the subject personal property. Further, since the Defendant had objected to the sale of
personal property as exempt, that the Plaintiff would proceed only against the other assets
of the Defendant. See the District Court's minutes of said conference, R. at 632 to 633, a
copy of which is attached in the Addendum hereto under Tab 3. Since the Defendant's

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stated objection to the writ of execution was that the personal property was exempt, and
the Plaintiff was proceeding without executing on personal property, the Court allowed

i

the Plaintiff to proceed, over the Defendant's objections.
9.

On June 22, 2009, Defendant filed a "Motion to Set Aside Summary

Judgment and Quash Writ of Execution" with the District Court, with memorandum in
support thereof. R. at 637 to 647, a copy of which is attached in the Addendum hereto
i

under Tab 4.
10.

In Defendant's memorandum in support of his motion to quash the writ of

execution, Defendant argued that the writ of execution should be quashed as to any
personal property of the Defendant, in that said property constituted tools of the trade for
the Defendant and "should be exempt from execution." R. at 642.
11.

In a hearing on June 24, 2009, the District Court ordered additional

argument to be held on Defendant's motion to quash the writ of execution. The District
Court ordered additional oral argument to be held on July 8, 2009. Inasmuch as the
sheriffs sale was then set for July 7, 2009, Plaintiff informed the District Court and
Defendant that the sale could be postponed. See the minutes of said hearing, at R. 648, a
copy of which is attached in the Addendum hereto under Tab 5.
12.

On July 8, 2009, the District Court heard oral argument and denied

Defendant's motion to quash the writ of execution. R. at 723.
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13.

On July 9, 2009, the Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal of the District

Court's Order denying his motion to set aside the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and to
quash the subject writ of execution, together with a Motion for Temporary Stay of
Execution. R. at 733 to 741, copies of which are attached in the Addendum hereto under
Tab 6.
14.

In Defendant's Motion for Stay of Execution and at If 15 of his

Memorandum in support of said motion, Defendant noted that the sheriffs sale, as
postponed with prior notice as aforesaid, was then scheduled for July 19, 2009 at 11:00
a.m. R. at 733 and 737, respectively, Tab 6 in the Addeiidiun hereto.
15.

On September 9, 2009, this Court dismissed the Defendant's appeal of the

District Court's Order denying Defendant's motion to set aside the judgment and quash
the writ of execution, for failure of the Defendant to file the docketing statement within
the time permitted Utah R. App. P. 9. R. at 758.
16.

On July 15, 2009, the Sanpete County Sheriffs Office issued its Certificate

of Sale, wherein it was established that the Plaintiff Mike Meguerditchian was the
successful and only bidder at the sheriffs sale conducted on Jiily 10, 2009, purchasing the
interest of the Defendant in real property and water rights as follows:
a.

$3,000 for the Defendant's interest in tax parcel 20232X1;

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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b.

$30,000 for the Defendant's interest in tax parcel 20221 (the sale of

the Defendant's interest in said parcels of real property is the subject of the

*

Defendant's Appeal);
c.

$30,000 for the Defendant's interest in Water Right No. 51-224 (the

District Court's ruling setting aside the sheriffs sale as to this water right is the
subject of the Plaintiff s Cross-Appeal); and
d.

$3,000 for the Defendant's interest in other, unspecified water rights

in Sanpete County. The order of the District Court setting aside the sale of these
unspecified water rights is not challenged in the subject Appeal or Cross-Appeal.

<

R. at 808 to 809, a copy of which is attached in the Addendum hereto under Tab 7.
17.

On December 9, 2009, the Defendant filed his Motion to Set Aside Sale,

arguing only that the sheriffs sale should be set aside exclusively because "more real
properly and water rights were sold and the sheriffs sale than was necessary to satisfy
i

amounts due" to the Plaintiff. R. at 763. A copy of said motion and memorandum in
support thereof, R. at 759 to 763, is attached in the Addendum hereto at Tab 8.
Defendant made no payment of tender of payment in redemption of the items sold at the
sheriffs sale, and has not moved for the extension of the redemption period.
18.

On September 15, 2010, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact

Conclusions of Law and Order, Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion
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to Set Aside Sheriffs Sale. R. 1045 to 1059, a copy of which is attached in the
Addendum hereto under Tab 9.
19.

The District Court found that the prices bid at the sheriffs sale for both the

real property and water rights were inadequate, as compared to their fair market value.
The District Court found that the real property had a fair market value of $505,000, for
which the Plaintiff had bid a total of $33,000.00. R. at 1046,fflf2 and 3.
20.

The District Court found that the water rights had a value of $7,500.00 per

acre foot, for which the Plaintiff had bid a total of $33,000.00. The District Court did not
find the total number of acre feet or other water rights of the Defendant, but noted that the
Defendant held in excess of 20 acre feet of water. R. at 1047, ]fl[ 4 and 5.
21.

The District Court found that there were no irregularities in the sale of real

property, and on that basis, denied the Defendant's motion to set aside the sheriffs sale of
real property. R. at 1048 to 1050.
22.

The District Court found that because the Notice of Sale did not describe

water rights that had been previously severed from Water Right #51-224, and did not
specifically describe the other water rights of the Defendant in Sanpete County, said
descriptions were inadequate, constituting an irregularity in the sale of water rights, and
set aside the sheriffs sale all water rights on that basis, including the rights of the
Defendant in the water right specifically described as Water Right #51 -224. Id.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In attempting to satisfy a judgment in his favor that had accrued to approximately
$66,000.00, the Plaintiff requested that the sheriff proceed by writ of execution to cause
four items to be sold, the Defendant's interest in two parcels of real property, the
Defendant's interest in one particular water right, and the Defendant's interest generally
in other water rights in Sanpete County, Utah. Prior to the time set for said sale, multiple
hearings were conducted by the District Court, pursuant to various motions filed by the
Defendant objecting to the sale of personal property, moving to quash the writ of
execution generally, and moving for a temporary stay of execution. The sheriffs sale was
validly postponed at the Defendant's instance and with full notice to the Defendant. The
Defendant was informed prior to the sale that the Plaintiff and sheriff could not
adequately locate and identify personal property in order for it to be sold. The Defendant
did not oppose the failure to sell personal property, indeed, the Defendant demanded that
personal property not be sold.
The District Court correctly applied the two part test re-affirmed by this Court in
Pyper v. Bond, requiring both inadequate price and irregularities in the sale, in ruling on
the Defendant's motion to set aside the sale. The District Court found no irregularities in
the sale of the real property and refused to set aside the sheriffs sale as to said real
property. The Defendant has failed and refused to avail himself of the remedy of
redemption, at the same time complaining that the purchase price paid was unreasonably
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low. Further, the Defendant claims primarily that the failure of the sheriff to first sell
personal property constitutes irregularity in the sale, even though the Defendant had
notice and opportunity to direct the first sale of personal property and failed to do so.
Indeed the Defendant demanded that personal property not be sold.
The District Court found that the failure to specifically describe the individual
water rights of the Defendant constituted an irregularity, and set aside the sale of water
rights on that basis. However, in doing so, the District Court also set aside the sale of
Water Right # 51-224 that was specifically and individually identified and sold.
This Court should affirm the two-part test articulated in Pyper v. Bond as the
correct standard for the District Court to apply in considering a motion to set aside the
sheriffs sale. In doing so, the District Court's ruling refusing to set aside the sheriffs
sale as to the real property sold should be affirmed, and the District Court's ruling setting
aside the sale of Water Right # 51 -224 should be set aside tc • - ; = >»lited extent.

ARGUMENT
1. The District Court Correctly Applied the Two Prong Test of Both Inadequacy of
Price and Irregularities Attending the Sale in Determining the Appropriateness of
Setting Aside the Sheriffs Sale
Defendant argues that the two-part test affirmed in Pyper v. Bond is not the
applicable standard for allowing the District Court to set aside a sheriffs sale. Defendant
contends that a sheriffs sale may be set aside if the sale price is inadequate, "even if there
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are no irregularities in the sale." Brief of Appellant, p. 10. In support of that proposition,
Defendant refers to dicta in the 1894 Utah Territorial case of Young v. Schroeder, 10
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Utah 155, 37 P. 252, (1894) affd, 161 U.S. 334, 16 S. Ct. 512, 40 L. Ed. 721 (1896),
stating vaguely that "it may well be doubted whether every such case would be beyond
the power of a court of equity to receive against." Id. at 254. "Every such case" referred
to by the Court was "[i]f the inadequacy is so gross as at once to shock the conscience of
all fair and impartial minds, if the sacrifice is such that every honest man would hesitate
to take advantage of it,

" Id. ^emphasis added). No standard to invoke that theoretical

construct has been proffered, and no case has applied it. Every case setting aside a

{

sheriffs sale has relied upon irregularities related to the sheriffs sale or the redemption
process in order to grant that equitable relief.
Young v. Schroeder was "not a case which rests on mere inadequacy of price
alone, but one where the sales complained of were attended by such substantial
i

irregularities as must have prevented a sale at a fair sum." Id. at 254. That court noted
that even in the case of great inadequacy of price at the sheriffs sale, there still must be at
least "slight circumstances of unfairness in the conduct of the party benefitted by the sale
to raise the presumption of fraud." Id, citing Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 192, 6 S.
Ct. 686, 692, 29 L. Ed. 839 (1886).
The Young v. Scroeder court went further to confirm the necessity of a two-part
test, i.e., inadequate price and irregularities attendant to the sale, holding that:
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"All the cases unite in the doctrine that on gross inadequacy of price.,
coupled with irregularities attending the sale,... it is the duty of the courts to
set the sale aside, unless the complaining party is estopped by his own
laches."
Id. (emphasis added). As set forth more fully below, in addition to the lack of any
irregularities in the sheriffs sale, the Defendant here should be equitably estopped from
objecting to the conduct of the sheriffs sale based on his own actions.
The dicta in the 1894 case of Young v. Schroeder was based on other dicta, not the
holding, of the 1856 case of Byers v. Surget, 60 U.S. 303, 15 L. Ed. 670 (1856). Even the
Byers opinion required both elements of inadequacy of price and irregularities in the sale
to set aside the sheriffs sale, it was not decided on mere inadequacy of price alone. The
Appellant in Byers, in proceedings to satisfy a claim of $39.00, caused the Sheriff to sell
14,000 acres of land worth $40,000.00 to $70,000.00. Appellant's bid at that sheriffs
sale was nine dollars and thirteen and one-half cents. The Appellant himself demanded to
post the notices, not allowing the Sheriff to do so, and then refused the debtor's proffer of
the redemption price, among other irregularities. Id. at 306. The Court there noted these
irregularities in holding that the sale could be set aside, as follows:
"Thus, when we advert to the irregular and extraordinary character of the
judgment procured through the agency of the appellant-to his eagerness,
that could not await the action of the officer of the court-his assumption of
the functions of the clerk, in taxing the costs, and in writing out the
execution-his preparation and delivery to the sheriff of a description and list
of the lands of the appellee, amounting to more than fourteen thousand
acres-his requisition of a seizure of the whole of those lands in satisfaction
of the sum of thirty-nine dollars-his inflexible demand upon the sheriff,
under threats of prosecution, to expose to sale the entire levy-his purchase
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of all these lands for the sum of nine dollars and thirteen and a half
cents-and his refusal after the sale and purchase to accept, in redemption of
these lands so sacrificed, a sum of money tendered to him much more than
equal to the costs, with all the expenses incident to the judgment: when all
these acts on the part of the appellant are adverted to, they impel irresistibly
to the conclusion, that the gross inadequacy of consideration in the sale and
purchase of these lands was the premeditated result which the proceedings
by the appellant were put in practice to insure....
Upon the whole case, we are constrained to view the entire transaction
impeached by the appellee as one that cannot be sustained without the
subversion of the principles and rules either of legal or moral justice.

Byers v. Surget, 60 U.S. 303 at 311-12 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the
Defendant in the instant case before this Court did not proffer any redemption price, he
sought only to set aside the sheriffs sale in its entirety.
The holding of the case in Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644 (Utah 1954), relied
upon by the Defendant, was specifically based on the Court's finding that both elements
of inadequate price and irregularities attending the sale were present. The Court held
that:
"In the instant case there can be no doubt of the gross inadequacy of the
consideration and from the facts that Dowse knew that the judgment for
costs could easily have been satisfied from a levy of personal property
known by him to be owned by Pender, and which he was very careful not to
direct the sheriff to levy upon and sell, plus his and his attorney's studious
silence after the quitclaim deed had been received about their intention to
collect the judgment for costs even though they saw Pender and his attorney
on several occasions before and after the execution sale, justified the court
in concluding the sale was attended by unfairness and was tainted with
fraud. It therefore did not err in setting aside the sale and cancelling the
sheriffs deed."
Id. at 648 (emphasis added).
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The case of Bangerter v. Petty, 2010 UT App 49, 228 P.3d 1250, relied upon by
the Defendant, made no ruling that a sheriffs sale could be set aside in the absence of
irregularities. There, the Court overturned the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
judgment creditor, and remanded the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing
to determine if any irregularities were involved in the sheriffs sale. That Court ruled
that:
"1f 19 The trial court will be required to hold an evidentiary hearing
because many of the relevant facts are not in the record. Bangerter1 s brief
contends that she did not have notice of the sale and thus did not have the
opportunity to challenge it or protect her rights at the execution sale.
However, Bangerter filed no affidavit stating she never received notice of
the sale at her home where she was residing, and because the trial court did
not hold an evidentiary hearing, there are no facts in the record supporting
her contentions.
1f 20 However, the record makes clear that, at least according to his
sworn documents, the sheriff served all the appropriate notices. The trial
court on remand will be required to determine whether Bangerter had notice
of the sheriffs sale."
M a t 1J1119 and 20.
This Court in Bangerter v. Petty concluded specifically that there must be both inadequate
price and irregularities in the sale, and even if those two elements existed, the
Defendant's own actions may bar the equitable relief of setting aside the sale. That
conclusion was as follows:
"1f 23 In sum, we remand to the trial court for a factual hearing on whether
the sale should be voided, or if the sale 'moves the conscience of the court,'
such that equitable redemption should apply, which, following Young and
Pyper, will involve a balancing of whether the sale price was grossly
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inadequate, whether there were gross irregularities in the proceedings, and
whether Bangerter is barred by her own laches"
Id. at ^23.
There is no binding precedent, cited by the Defendant or otherwise, that has
involved facts where mere inadequacy of price was found sufficient to set aside a
sheriffs sale. No authority has been cited for over-ruling the two part test applied in
Pyper v. Bond. It is well settled that in Utah, in light of the substantial period of
redemption allowed to the judgment debtor, a sheriffs sale must be sustained unless it is
manifestly unfair. "'There is a general policy to sustain a sheriffs sale' unless '[it is]
manifestly unfair ... especially ... in Utah which has a substantial period of redemption.'
Beesley v. Hatch, 863 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1993)." Bangerter v. Petty, 2010 UT App
49 at ]f 15. As borne out by all of the applicable caselaw, that unfairness must be
demonstrated by more than merely inadequate price.
The Defendant's remedy for an inadequate sale price is redemption, under Rule
69C, Ut. R. Civ. P. A low purchase price at a sheriffs sale benefits a judgment debtor,
by making the property easy to redeem. Conversely, requiring a high purchase price
makes the equity of redemption more costly to the debtor, and may leave the judgment
creditor without a remedy. It would be inequitable to require a judgment creditor of
modest means and judgment amount, faced with a wealthy judgment debtor holding only
large, valuable assets, to be required to bid in full fair market value for any asset
presented at the sheriffs sale. That would be impossible for many judgment creditors,
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leaving them without a remedy against weathly judgment debtors. The rule of law must
allow the collection and enforcement of judgments rendered in our courts, otherwise,
judicial decisions become meaningless.
The standard articulated in Pyper v. Bond requiring a two-part test should be
upheld, as equitably addressing the interests of both parties and being consistent with the
intent of the redemption right granted to judgment debtors by Rule 69C, Ut. R. Civ. P.
This Court, in the Pyper v. Bond decision, noted the judgment creditor's concern that
relying on inadequate price alone would "make it almost impossible to effectively lien
property to collect a judgment because 'every creditor would have to analyze their
purchase price against the value of the property being sold to determine whether there is a
gross inadequacy of price.'" Pyper v. Bond, 2009 UT App 331 at ]f 19. The Court
addressed that concern by noting that the District Court properly relied upon "both
inadequacy of price and the unfair actions" of the judgment creditor. Id. The Young v.
Schroeder standard requiring both gross inadequacy of price and irregularities attending
the sale, recognized and applied in Pyper v. Bond, should be upheld in the instant case.
See Pyper v. Bond, 2009 UT App 331 at 111.

II. The District Court Properly Concluded That There Were No Irregularities
Involving the Sale of Real Property at the Sheriffs Sale
The District Court found that there were no irregularities involving the sale of real
property by the sheriff, and upheld the validity of the sheriffs sale on that basis. That
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factual determination by the District Court must be upheld here unless that finding is
"against the clear weight of the evidence," or if the Court is otherwise able to "reach a
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firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 9 A3 P.2d 247, 255
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).x Defendant alleges three instances of irregularities in the sheriffs
sale, as follows:
"The irregularities in the sale are: 1) Meguerditichian's failure to sell
Smith's personal property known to him and of sufficient value to cover the
judgment; 2) the Notice of Sale which publicly advertised the Sheriffs
Sale for July 7, 2009, but conducting the sale on July 10, 2009; and 3)
Meguerditichian's attorney had formed an LLC with Meguerditichian for
the development of the real property as a subdivision and exercised
direction and control of whether and how much of the real property, water
rights and non-exempt personal property would be sold at the sale.
Brief of Appellant, p. 8. Those alleged irregularities shall be addressed below in reverse
order.
A. Alleged Irregularity No. 3: Plaintiffs Subsequent Formation of a Limited
Liability Company with Counsel to Hold the Real Property.
Defendant has the burden of first marshalling the evidence supporting the
challenged finding of the District Court that there were no irregularities in the sheriffs
sale of the real property, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P., as correctly noted by

1

As a threshold matter, this Court should note that the Defendant's motion to set
aside the sheriffs sale was made exclusively on the basis that "more real property and
water rights were sold and the sheriffs sale than was necessary to satisfy amounts due" to
the Plaintiff. R. at 763. See Statement of the Case, supra, at ^ 17. Defendant did not
allege or preserve the issue that there were any irregularities in the sheriffs sale in his
initial motion to the District Court to set aside said sale.
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the Defendant, citing Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 19A P.2d 847 (Ut. Ct. App.
1990). Brief of Appellant at p. 12. The only evidence supporting this allegation of
irregularity is that the Plaintiff, subsequent to the sheriffs sale, formed a limited liability
company with the assistance and participation of counsel to hold the property purchased
at the sheriffs sale.
It is undisputed that the Plaintiff personally was the purchaser at the sheriffs sale.
See the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, R. 1057-1059, a copy of which is attached hereto in
the Addendum under Tab 7. There is no evidence that any limited liability company had
been formed by the Plaintiff at the time of the sheriffs sale (it had not). There is no
evidence that the Defendant made any attempt subsequent to the sheriffs sale to redeem
the property, he did not. There is no evidence presented that any attempts to redeem the
property by the Defendant were in any way compromised or restricted by the subsequent
formation of a limited liability company by the Plaintiff. Certainly the advice of counsel
with the Plaintiff after the fact related to the appropriate method of holding real property
cannot be seen as inappropriate, were that the case, essentially all sheriffs sales would be
set aside for irregularity. Defendant's attempt to color the advice and participation of
Plaintiffs counsel after the fact as being somehow prejudicial to the Defendant is without
merit or justification. Defendant has failed to demonstrate how this fact supports a ruling
that the District Court's finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, i.e., that this
did not constitute an irregularity in the conduct of the sheriffs sale.
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B. Alleged Irregularity No. 2: The Sheriffs Sale Was Conducted on July 10,
2008. Instead of July 7. 2008 as Originally Noticed.
•

••

-

-

-

—
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As set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, the sheriffs sale was postponed to
July 10, 2008, with notice to the Defendant, and at the instance of the Defendant's motion
to quash the sheriffs sale. Rule 69B(c), Ut. R. Civ. P., provides authority for the sheriff

i

to postpone the sheriffs sale, as follows:
"(c) Postponement. If the officer finds sufficient cause, the officer may
postpone the sale. The officer shall declare the postponement at the time
and place set for the sale. If the postponement is longer than 72 hours,
notice of the rescheduled sale shall be given in the same manner as the
original notice of sale."
The sheriffs sale, originally set for July 7, 2008, was postponed to July 10, 2008, to
accommodate oral argument on the Defendant's motion. Since the postponement was not
for more than 72 hours, no additional written notice needed to be provided.
The sheriffs sale was postponed at the instance of the Defendant, to accommodate
additional oral argument on the Defendant's motion to quash the sheriffs sale and set
aside the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. See Statement of the Case, supra, at ^ 11
and 12. The Defendant was fully aware and informed that the sale had been postponed, in
accordance with the relevant procedural rule as set forth above. See the Defendant's
acknowledgment of the postponed date of the sale, in Defendant's motion for stay of
execution filed with the District Court, Tab 6 in the Addendum hereto. R. 737 at ^ 12.
The postponement of the sheriffs sale was appropriate under Rule 69B(c), Ut. R. Civ. P.,
was done at the instance of the Defendant himself, and with full and acknowledged notice
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to the Defendant. Defendant cannot claim, and did not claim at the District Court, that
the postponement of the sheriffs sale constituted an irregularity in that sale.
C. Alleged Irregularity No. 1: Plaintiffs Failure to Sell Personal Property in
Satisfaction of the Judgment.
The District Court did not make any factual findings, after completion of an
evidentiary hearing, that the Plaintiff or the sheriff knew of or could locate and identify
sufficient personal property to satisfy the Plaintiff s judgment. The District Court found
that there was insufficient information available as to the identity and value of any
personal property. See the transcript of the District Court's ruling following said
evidentiary hearing, attached as an exhibit to the District Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Tab 9 in the Addendum hereto, at R. 1053 to 1054.
It is undisputed that the Defendant did not appear at the sheriffs sale or otherwise
identify personal property and request that certain personal property be first seized and
sold. To the contrary, the Defendant demanded that all personal property not be sold, as
set forth in more detail below, claiming that all personal property was exempt from
execution. Defendant cannot now claim that the Plaintiffs failure to first cause said
personal properly to be sold constitutes an irregularity in the sheriffs sale.
In marshalling all of the evidence that supports and refutes the District Court's
finding that there was no irregularity in the sheriffs failure to sell personal property, the
best evidence that the Defendant can produce is that the sheriff did not sell the personal
property because serial numbers and model numbers were not available, and he did not
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know the location of the personal property. Brief of Appellant at p. 13, items 1 and 3.
There is no evidence that the sheriff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining

{

that information, there is similarly no evidence that the Plaintiff had access to that
information and failed to provide it to the sheriffs office. There is absolutely no
evidence, certainly no "clear weight of evidence," that the District Court erred in finding
that the sheriff proceeded appropriately without execution on personal property.
In multiple hearings prior to the sheriffs sale, first in the Defendant's objection to
the writ of execution and Request for Hearing, and then Defendant's motion to quash the
writ of execution, Defendant demanded that personal property not be sold by the sheriff,

i

claiming that it was all exempt from execution as tools of the trade. Statement of the
Case, supra, ^flf 4, 8 and 10, see also. Defendant's Request for Hearing on the writ of
execution and motion to quash the writ of execution, in the Addendum hereto under Tabs
2 and 4. Defendant had full notice and opportunity to attend the sheriffs sale, and direct
the order of the sale of personal properly. Defendant failed to avail himself of that right,
and conversely, demanded that personal property not be sold. The sale was conducted by
the sheriffs following multiple hearings at which the Defendant was informed that any
personal property would not be sold.
The Defendant's inaction at the sheriffs sale, and pre-sale multiple demands that
personal property not be sold, invoke the equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel,
preventing the Defendant from prevailing on his claim that the failure to sell any personal
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properly constitutes an irregularity in the sheriffs sale. As set forth above, the standard
established by the Court in Young v. Schroeder, as applied in Pyper v. Bond, allow the
Court to set aside a sheriffs sale, if the two-prong test of inadequate price and
irregularities in the sale are met, only if the Defendant is not equitably estopped by his
own conduct. The District Court found no evidence that the sheriff or Plaintiff could
identify personal property of sufficient value to satisfy the Plaintiff s judgment. Even if
that were the case, the Defendant's own actions and demands cause that he be estopped
from claiming irregularity in the conduct of the sheriffs sale on the basis that personal
property was not sold first.

III. The District Court Committed Error in Concluding That There Were
Irregularities Involving the Sale of the Water Right #51-224 at the Sheriffs Sale
The District Court noted that the Plaintiffs bid at the sheriffs sale was $309000.00
for Water Right # 51-224, and $3,000.00 for other, unspecified water rights in Sanpete
County, Utah. R. at 1047,16 of the District Court's Findings of Fact. The District
Court then found that said total price of $33,000.00 was inadequate, based on the
testimony of the overall value of said water rights. Id.
The District Court found irregularity in the description of the water rights
generally in order to set aside the sheriffs sale as to water rights. Plaintiffs CrossAppeal seeks to reverse the District Court's order only as it applies to Water Right # 5 1 224 specifically. Since that water right was described specifically there can be no
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irregularity as to the sale of that specific water right, according to the District Court's
rationale. Therefore, the District Court's order should be overturned to that limited
extent, and on that basis alone.
Although not necessary to overturn the District Court's ruling as it applies to
Water Right # 51-224, it should be noted that the price paid individually for said water
right, $30,000.00, was more than the value of said water right according to the testimony
of the Defendant. The District Court found that the applicable water had a fair market
value of $7,500.00 per acre foot. Id. at ^ 4. In Defendant's Reply Memorandum in
support of his motion to set aside the sale, the Defendant stated that he had 3.275 acre feet
of water remaining in Water Right # 51-224 at the time of the sheriffs sale. By that
analysis (3.275 x $7,500 - $24,562.50, less than the $30,000.00 paid by the Plaintiff), the
Plaintiff paid more than fair market value, and cannot be said to have paid an inadequate
price.
However, the District Court's ruling turned on its conclusion that there were
irregularities in the description of the water rights, fulfilling the second prong of the test
affirmed in Pyper v. Bond. In marshalling the evidence that would support the District
Court's finding of an irregularity in that description, all evidence goes to the insufficiency
of the description of water rights other than Water Right # 51-224, which were not
identified separately, or described and sold separately at the sheriffs sale.
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The District Court ruled that the subject water rights were real property, and must
be described and sold separately, pursuant to Rule 69B(d), Ut. R. Civ. P. R. at 1037,
transcript of the District Court's ruling at the hearing on Defendant's motion to set aside
the sale. The District Court found that water rights owned by the Defendant, that had
been previously severed from Water Right # 51-224, had been given separate water right
numbers and those numbers were not specifically identified at the sheriffs sale. R. at
1048, If 9 of the District Court's Findings of Fact.
There is no evidence or finding that Plaintiff or the sheriff failed to adequately
describe the Defendant's interest in Water Right # 51-224. Plaintiff does not appeal the
District Court's ruling as is applies to other, unspecified water rights that the Defendant
may have held in Sanpete County, Utah. However, the District Court erred when it set
aside the sale of Defendant's interest in the specific Water Right #51-224. There is no
evidence that said right was not adequately identified for purposes of the sheriffs sale.
Therefore, the District Court's ruling setting aside the sheriffs sale of Water Right #51224 should be reversed, "for clear error,... against the clear weight of the evidence, ...."
Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the District
Court's ruling denying the Defendant's motion to set aside the sale of real property be
upheld. Further, Plaintiff requests that the District Court's ruling setting aside the sale of
Water Right # 51-224 only, without regard to the sale of other unspecified water rights,
be reversed, to that limited extent. The Defendant's proper remedy was redemption of the
property which he claims was sold for an unreasonably low price. Having failed and
refused to avail himself of that proper remedy, the sheriffs sale should be affirmed as set
forth above.

vtfK.day of June, 2011.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this OU

mi M. ramg
A ttorne\s\for Apjpsllee/Cross-Appellant
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ternUM
fltfffifttffc
M ^ ^ Y ^ ^ ^

^

l

^

D

(b)

Cheofc if appKcabte: I claitao-wnetshipof aUorpart of the property tafosa
and I am mot am of tie persons agaiast whom a judgment has-been entered.

D

(c)

caxedc if applicable: H o fiotowa the property taken,

,

I REQUEST THAT THIS MATTER BE SET K>tt A HEARING.
THE STATEMENTS MADE IN WXB BEQUEST AKE T#CE TO THE BEST OF M*T
jmOTOSPGE Mm BELIEF.

is $fc- day of sjto>l£^
DATED this

_

2 0 ^
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TSfamePnated
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Addres3
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»

V
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tmrnmiAfl-

^
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..

nimi^Tl
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Telephone Nutttber

tfudge DAyid &« Ww<rer
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of The Smith Family Living Trust,
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
CaseNo.20100850-CA
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Notice of Sheriffs Sale
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT
—ooOoo—
MIKE MEGUERD1TCHIAN, an Individual
Plaintiff
Vs.

"

Notice of Sale
Civil No. 050600136

MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee
Of The Smith Family Living Trust, u/a/d
March 19,1991
Defendants)
——OoOOO'""''-

To be sold at a Sheriffs Sale which will beheld at the Sanpete County
Courthouse located at 160 North Main, Manti, Utah on July 7,2009 at 11:00
a.m. all rights, title and Interest of the above named defendant, in and to the
following described real property:
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 31, Township 12 South,
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 88deg 59'57" East
1288.94 feet; thence North 79deg56'18" East 710.82 feet; thence North
59deg13'01" East 819.26 feet; thence North 58deg52'40" East 428.89 feet;
thence North 25deg47,50" East 129.558feet; thence South 424.763feet;thence
South 60deg18'17w West.788.156 feet; thence South 79deg29'31" West 504.635
feet; thence West 1935.19 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing: 9.42 acres, more or less (S#20232X1)
Oaker Hills Plat 4 (Phase IV) (Tax Serial #20221) more specifically described as:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section 30, Township 12 South,
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point of beginning being on
Section Line and being on the boundary line between Oaker Hills and Elk Ridge
. Subdivision; thence South 89deg43'46" west 1642.58 feet to the centerline of the
Oaker Hills access road and the following 14 courses; South 266.85 feet; thence
South 1.2deg56'35" East.282.88 feet; thence south 38deg25'13M East 274.87 feet;
thence South 44deg3T02" East .210.10 feet; thence South 70 deg 54'52" East
244.38 feet; thence South 63deg 38'47" East,237.37 feet; thence South 43 deg
36'34" East 204.14 feet; thence South 25 deg.21''l8" East 209.58 feet; thence
South 08 deg 56'10B West208.94feet; thence South32 deg 06'46" West 173.63
feet; thence South 75 deg 26'28" West 292.16 feet; thence North 89 deg 02'18"
West 234.57 feet; thence South 48 deg 04'38" West 112.48 feet; thence South
26 deg 52'33" West 394.85 feet; thence leaving said road centerline, South 61
deg 33'22" East 226.25 feet; thence South OOdeg 45'39" West 299.14 feet to a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fence corner and sixteen (1/16) corner; thence North 89deg 24'38" East 2615,95
feet; thenceNorth 00 deg 00'36" East2675.36feet; thence South 89 deg43'47"
West 1323.29 feet to the point of beginning.
Water Rights;
(1) All rights of the Defendants In water right number 51-224, and all other
rights ofthe Defendants in water coming from and the well producing
said water, said to be located approximately North 950 feet East 300.
feet from the Southwest corner, Section 4 Township 12 South Range 4
East, Salt Lake Basin Meridian.
(2) Other rights ofthe Defendants in water rights and/or interests In water
wells located in Sanpete County, Utah.
Terms of payment. Cash or certified funds only. Checks will be accepted
when accompanied by a letter from maker's bank that certifies funds are
available through two weeks after sale. A credit bid will be considered the same
as a cash bid when submitted by plaintiff or plaintiff's representative.
Dated this 19th day>of May, 2009

Sanpete County Sheriffs Department
On the 19th day of May, 2009 before me, a Notary Public, in and for the
County of Sanpete, State of Utah, personally appeared Robert Henningson,
Deputy Sheriff of Sanpete County, personally knownto me to be the person
described in and who executed the foregoing Instrument, and who acknowledged
to me that he executed the same as such, freely and voluntarily, and for the uses
and purposes as provided for by law.
WITNESS my hand arid seal this 19th day of May, 2009.

H&f M)U? L Uftrk^
Notary Public
$v
DEBBIE LHATCH
""' J0W/jypUBlf(J»5Mo/(iW«
r\ uiw»; »J
%V%W,^V

WO N0R TH MAiN
MANTI, UT 84042

X3'&t>'

COMM; £XR. 06-11 -2010
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' SIXTH DISTRICT COURT.
Sanpete County Sheriffs Office
Affidavit of Posting

CUftK M

wkf1**^-

»yON!1 NU'SH

STATE OF UTAH
:SS
COUNTY OF SANPETE
Robert Henningson, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows:
1. That I am a United Sates citizen 21 years of age, residing in Sanpete County,
State of Utah.
2. That on the 15th day of June, 2009 affiant completed posting conformed
copies of the Notice of Sheriff s Sale, a copy of which is attached hereto as an
exhibit and incorporated herein, at the following places within the city or
county wherein the property described in said Notice is located:
1) Address of Property:
Approximately 6700 East 35000 North, Fairview, UT
2) Manti City Building, 50 S Main, Manti,UT
3) Mt. Pleasant City Hall, 115 W Main, Mt, Pleasant, UT
4) Fairview Post Office, 50 West Center, Fairview, UT
5) Sanpete County Courthouse located at 160 North Main, Manti, Utah.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me
m

this 16 Day of June, 200'

t^Wu L t-fa-bK
Notary Public

Sanpete County SHeriff 's Office Atflclavlt of Posting

UttS^nt

VD29061584
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of The Smith Family Living Trust,
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
CaseNo.20100850-CA

TAB 3
District Court Minutes of
Status/Scheduling Conference.
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SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT-MANTI
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUBKDITCHXAN,
ir l a i n t % Ju L I

VS,

MAX SMITH

Clerk:

Et al,
Defendant.

MINUTED
STATUS/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Case NoJ 050600136 Ml
Judge:" MARVIN BAGLEY
Date:
June 17, 2009

selma;)

PRESENT
Plaintiff 'B Attorney (a) : PAUL M KING
Defendant's Attorney(s): KENT h FILLMORE
Audio
Tape Number:
West Ctr
Tape Count: 9:32-9:47
HEARING
TAPE: West Ctr ..COUNT: 9:32~9?47
Mr. King is present by phone. Court noted that Judge Mower has
previously entered a judment and there has been a Writ of Execution
issued, and-that there was a request for m hearing filed on the
Writ, Mr. King received the Writ of Execution.
Mr. Fillmore stated that he understood that we were here today to
schedule a hearing for this mot ton, not to hear it today-., but he
explained reasons for motion. One reason isthe attorney's fees
section in the Writ of Execution that is not supported by
the contract, and given there1a no statutory or contractual basis
for the attorneys fees they will have to challenge that part of
the Writ. Mr. Fillmore then addressed the lltools of the trade1'
issued on some heavy equipment that he feels should be
exempt as well. Mr. Fillmore would like to schedule a hearing to
address these issues.
Mr, King feels that a hearing may not be needed because the
Sheriff's levee has excluded any personal property and equipment,
so the "tools of the trade" exemption is not an issue. With regard
to the attorney's fees, the judgment itself calls for
additional attorney's fees incurred in execution efforts. Mr.
King stated that if a hearing is needed, he woul# like to see it
happen before the Sheriff's Sale,
Mr. Fillmore addressed a Writ of Praecipe that included some
personal property. Court reviewed that the Writ of Praecipe did
order that the personal property be sold first before the real
estate.
Mr. King stated that the Sheriff's declined to include any
personal property in the levee for the reason that they did not
have access to serial numbers of some of the equipment, Mr. King
PageJ. 1
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Case No: 050600136
Date:
Jun 17, 2009
stated that they are content to proceed on the real property and
related interests, and not execute on any personal property,
Mr. Fillmore is not content in going forth. He stated that he is
not against post judgment attorney's fees, but the judgment calls
for attorney's fees, so the amount their pursuing is based on
incorrect facts,
Mr, King stated that those issues are not before the court, the
defendant has not made a motion to set aside the judgment.
Court reviewed the judgment, paragraph 2, Court asked if there
has been an affidavit to augment the judgment. Mr. King said "no".
Court advised Mr. Fillmore that if he wanted to file a motion to
augment the judgment, then he will consider it, and if
there's not been a levy on the personal property, then there's
nothing before the Court.
Mr, Fillmore stated that there have been some progress on
negotiations, and he would like a week to file a motion* Mr. King
agreed, but expressed some concern about motion being filed before
the Sheriff's Sale on July 10, 2009,
Court ordered Mr, Fillmore to file the motion by Friday, June 19,.
2009, giving Mr, King time to respond, Status/Scheduling .
Conference is scheduled on June 24, 2009. Both counsel may appear
by phone.

Page
2 (last)
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUERDITCFIIAN, an individual,
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of The Smith Family Living Trust,
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
CaseNo.20100850-CA

TAB 4
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Summary
Judgment and Quash Writ of Execution
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Kent Fillmore #5693
820 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
Phone: 801-808-5893
Fax: 801-410-4365
Attorney for Defendant

Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment and Quash Writ

VD29088354
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050600136 SMITH.MAX

m THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF
UTAH
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT
)
)

MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an
individual j,
Plaintiff,

> MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY
) JUDGMENT AND QUASH WRIT OF
EXECUTION
)

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MAX SMITH, individually and as a
Trustee of the Smith Family Living
Trust u/a/d March 19% 199.1,
Defendant

CASE NO.: 050600136

JUDGE: MARVIN B AGLEY

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, by and through his attorney of record and
respectfully moves this court to set aside summary judgment and quash the writ of
execution in this instant case, pursuant to Rules 60 and 64 Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,

•,

Respectfully submitted this _njS=^y

of June* 2009.

Attorney foitw Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
THIS IS TO CERTIFY ON THIS
f T ^ ~ DAY OF JUNE, 20091 DID CAUSE
TO BE MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THIS MOTION TO SET
ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND QUASH WRIT OF EXECUTION TO THE
OFFICE OF PAUL M. KING, HOOLE AND KING, L.C AT (801) 272-7557.

Kent L, Fillmore
Attorney for Defendant
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050600136 SMITH.MAX

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
m AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT
MIKE MEGUERDITCH1AN, an
individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as a
Trustee of the Smith Family Living
Trust u/a/d March 19*, 1991,
Defendant

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND QUASH WRIT OF
EXECUTION
CASE NO.: 050600136
JUDGE; MARVIN BAGLEY

COMES NOW DEFENDANT by and through Ms attorney of record and
respectfully submits the following Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion
to Set aside Summary Judgment and Quash Writ of Execution.
• STATEMENT QF FACTS
1,

Defendant was represented in this instant case by D. Christopher Van Campen
until Mr, Van Campen was suspendedfrompractice on April 17th, 2008,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. VanCampen failed to notify Defendant of his suspension from the Bar
and has had no further'contact with Defendant since then.

3.

Defendant has received no notice of process since before the suspension of
Mr. VanCampen until the Writ of Execution was served.

4.

Defendant was not notified of motions and hearings to establish the value of
lot 349 or to contest the Application for Writ of Execution.

5.

Defendant reached settlement with Plainti ff by conveying half interest in a
9.45 acre lot on the county road with telephone and electrical access,
reasonably valued at between $75,000.00 and $80,000,00, This settlement is
notfactoredintothejudgment.

6.

Plaintiff paid $5,000.00 for Lot No. 349.

7.

The value of lot No. 349 is far less than $27,000.00.

8.

Defendant continued to develop Plat 4 as per agreement between the parties

9.

Defendant rented a bulldozerfromRed Z to fill a wash.

10.

Defendant has been cutting and graveling roads to further the agreement to
develop the 77.25 acres of Plat 4.

11.

Defendant has built a vinyl fence to decorate entry to north side of 77,25 acres
ofPlat4.

12.

Defendant has installed gates to 77.25 acres of Plat 4.
ARGUMENT I
Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) upon motion and under such terms as are just, the

court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On April 17,2008 Defendant's lawyer, Christopher Van Campen, was
suspended from the practice of law in the State of Utah. Defendant was not
informed of any subsequent proceedings in this case by his former lawyer or by the
Plaintiff. Defendant was specifically uninformed on the issue of damages that had
been reserved by Judge Mower in his order following the hearing on Summary
Judgment
Contrary to Mr. VanCampen's affidavit, Defendant has not changed his
address. Defendant has maintained the same address for 20 years, and could have
been contacted if Mr. VanCampen had made any effort to do so.
Defendant strenuously objects to the $27,000.00 value assigned to Lot 349 in
the adjudication ofPlaintiff s Second Cause of Action. The judgment should be
modified to reflect the actual value of damages through qualified appraisals.
The Judgment should be modified to eliminate pre-judgment attorney fees.
Under the agreement between the parties no attorney fees were to be awarded
without first resorting to mediation. Plaintiff failed to initiate mediation and should
not be granted attorney fees in contradiction with the contract between the parties,
paragraphs 7 & S.
ARGUMENTII
Quash Writ of Execution
Pursuant to Rule 64(d)(2) the court should enter an order directing the officer
to release the property, on grounds that the writ was wrongfully obtained, and that
the property is exempt from seizure.
The order of the court, dated December 17a 2007, specifically declined to
dissolve the contract between the patties for the development of 77.25 acres. The
Writ of Execution (Section C) seeks to accomplish that through the sale of those
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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acres which re the subject of that contract

rg:

(

The Writ of execution (Section D) also

seeks water rights which are committed to the development of the subject of the
patties intact agreement Plaintiff should not be able to gain by the Writ of
Execution what he was denied by the summary judgment
Exempt Properties:
Writ of Execution (Section C) also seeks to sell parcels of land (Lots 401-412)
which have been sold or encumbered. (See Affidavit of Max Smith,)
Writ of Execution (Section A) lists personal property necessary for the
development of the property, that is, tools of the trade and as such should be exempt
from execution. This equipment is necessary for the contfouing contract to develop
the 77.25 acres that are the subject of the parties continuing agreement.
Section B of the Writ of Execution, seeking to sell the 9.45 acre lot, is
legitimate subject and uncontested by Defendant. However, Plaintiff should not be
enriched twice to compensate him for the same lost piece of land. If the Plaintiff
sells those 9,4 acres to satisfy the judgment, all funds in excess of the judgment
should be returned to Defendant.
CONCLUSION
The interests ofjustice would be best served by settling the judgment on the
actual facts and in accord with the previous orders of this court, and that exempt
property be excluded from the Writ of Execution,
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WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that
1.

Hie Judgment be stayed until an accurate value is determined for

compensation to Plaintiff for the loss of lot no. 349.
2.

That the Judgment be modified to reflect the real value of Plaintiffs damages.

3.

That the plat 4 development and any water rights be exempt from execution of

the judgment so that the contract between the parties may be fullfilled.
4.

That those parels of lanf sold or encumbered be excluded from the Writ of

Execution.
5.

That this case be held over for an evidentiary hearing value of lot no. 349.

6.

That prejudgment attorney fees be eliminated from the judgment.

7.

Any other orders which this court finds to be in the interest of justice.
Respectfully submitted this /^/^-day of June, 2009.
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THIS IS TO CERTIFY ON THIS [Jf^L
DAY OF JUNE, 20091 DID CAUSE
TO BE A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THIS MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND QUASH
WRIT OF EXECUTION TO BE FAXED TO THE OFFICE OF PAUL M. KING,
HOOLE AND KING, L.C., 4276 SOUTH HIGHLAND DRIVE, SALT LAKE
CITY. UTAH 84124 AT (801) 272-7557.

*illmore
Attorney for Defendant
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050600136 SMITH.MAX

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF
UTAH
m AND FOR. SANPETE COUNTY, MAMT DEPARTMENT
)

MIKEMEGUERDITCHIAN, an
individual,
Plaintiff

)

)

AFFIDAVIT OF MAX SMITH

)

VS.

)
)

MAX SMITH, individually and as a
Trustee of the Smith Family Living
Trust u/a/d March 19th, 1991,
Defendant

)
)
)
)

CASE NO.: 050600136
JUDGE: MARVIN BAGLEY

JL
Affidavit of Max L> Smith in support of Defendants Motion to' Set Aside Summary
Judgment and to Quash the Writ of Execution.
I, Max Smith, do attest and affirm that I am competent to testify to the matters
stated herein and that the following facts are true and correct from my own personal
knowledge.
"•ST"
1.

I hired D. Christopher VanCampen to defend this suit.

O

LU
rj?
"<
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Pg: 11

' Mr, VanCampen failed to notify me of proceedings in the case after the
hearing for Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Aug 22ncl, 2007.

3;

I reached settlement with Mike Meguerditchian.by exchanging his interest in

Lot No. 349 for half interest in a 9.45 acre lot on the county road with
telephone and electrical access, reasonably valued $75,000.00 and
$80,000.00 in an exchange based on the estimated value of comparable lots
adjacent to that parcel.
4.

Plaintiff paid $5,000.00 for Lot No. 349.

5.

The value of lot No. 349 is far less than $27,000.00.

6.

I continued to develop Plat 4 as per agreement between me and Mike
Meguerditchian after the initial Summary Judgment.

7.

I rented a bulldozer from Red Z to fill a wash,

8.

I have been graveling roads to access 77,25 acres of Plat 4.

9.

1 have been widening and completing road access to 77.25 acres of Plat 4.

10.

I have built a vinyl fence to decorate the entry to the north side of 77.25 acres
of Plat 4.

11.

•

I have installed gates on 77.25 acres of Plat 4.
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Pursuant to UCA 46-5-1011 declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that
the foregoing is true md correct from my best recollection of personal experience.
So sworn this _ _ _ day of June, 2009.

Max Smith
Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
THIS IS TO CERTIFY ON THIS
DAY OF
, 20091
DID CAUSE A A TRUE AM) CORRECT COPY OF THIS AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT TO THE
OFFICE OF PAUL M. KING, HOOLE AND KING, L.C., 4276 SOUTH
HIGHLAND DRIVE, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84124

' Kent L, Fillmore
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of The Smith Family Living Trust,
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
CaseNo.20100850~CA

TABS
Minutes of Initial District Court Hearing on
Defendant's Motion to Quash Writ of Execution
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of The Smith Family Living Trust,
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
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alXTH DISTRICT COURT

JUL - 9 PHI2t2I
Kent Fillmore #5693
820 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
Phone: 801-808-5893
Fax; 801-410-4365
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT
MEKEMEGUEKDITCHIAN, an
individual,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
CASE NO.; 050600136

vs.
MAX SMITH* individually and as a
Trustee of the Smith Family Living
Trust u/a/d March 19* 1991,
Defendant

JUDGE: MARVIN BAOLEY

Comes now Defendant, by and through his attorney of record and respectfully
submits this Notice of Appeal in this instant case of the Order dated July 8,2009,
denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment and Quash Writ of
Execution. This appeal is taken from the Sixth Judicial District Court for The State
of Utah in and for Sanpete County, Manti Department to the Utah Court of Appeals.

is
Respectfully submitted this

reijfFillmore

Notice of Appeal

Attorney for the Defendant

VD29226866

050600136

f&day of July, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY.

Gf*fk^

THIS IS TO CERTIFY ON THIS
DAY OF JULY, 20091 DID CAUSE
TO BE FAXED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THIS NOTICE OF APPEAL
TO THE OFFICE OF PAUL M. KING, HOOLE AND KING, L.C. AT (801) 2727557.

Kent L. Fillmore
Attorney for Defendant
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Kent Fillmore #5693
820 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
Phone: 801-808-5893
Fax:801-410-4365
Attorney for Defendant

Motion for Temporary Stay of Execution

VD29225822

050600136 SMITH.MAX

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND .FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT
MIKE MEGUERDITCHtAN, an
individual,
PloJrtti^
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY STAY
OF EXECUTION

vs.

CASE NO.: 050600136
MAX SMITH* individually and as a
Trustee ofthe Smith Family Living
Trust u/a/d March 19th, 1991,
Defendant

JUDGE: MARVIN BAGLEY

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, by and through Ms attorney of record pursuant
to Rule 62 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and respectfully moves this court to delay
the execution of Judgment on the sale of property currently scheduled for July 10°\
'2009 for 17 to M y 27 days to allow Defendant to raise sufficient funds to satisfy the
judgment or to post a bond for the full amount of any bond required for a stay of
execution pending Defendant's appeal of denial of Defendant's to set aside Judgment
and Quash Writ of Execution.
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FACTS
1.

This court ordered that Defendant's Motion to Set aside Default Judgment and

Quash writ of Execution be denied on July 8th, 2009..
2.

Defendant's Counterclaim remains in process and has not been adjudged.

3.

Some properties subject to sale the Writ of Execution are already sold under

contract to third parties- Affidavit of Max Smith
4.

Defendant's submitted a property evaluation which contained critical

information that contradicted the value the appraised value of property which is the
subject ofthe Judgment ~ to wit; the non-existance of a well on the property.
5.

Contrary to the appraisal attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs memorandum in

Support of Motion for final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil
procedure; There is no well on the property. There for Plaintiffs appraisal is
inaccurate and the amount awarded hi the judgment is likewise accurate.
Defendant's Appraisal.
6.

Defendant's Property Appraisal was submitted to the court as quick as

possible; timeliness of submission was beyond control of Defendant and his
Attorney.
7.

, The Judgment in question awarded a Principle Judgment in the amount

$27,000.00 which was based on the appraised value of a lot of land as of 9/24/08.
8.

The the interest fa the Judgment in question is calculated from 1/10/2000.

9.

Defendant was represented in this instant case by D. Christopher Van Campen

until Mr/Van Campen was suspended from practice on April 17th, 2008,
10.

Mr. VanCampen failed to notify Defendant of his suspensionfromme Bar

and has had. no further contact with Defendant since then.
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Defendant lias received no notice of process since before the suspension of

Mr, VanCampen until the Writ of Execution was served.
12,

Defendant was not notified of motions and hearings to establish the value of

lot 349 or to contest the Application for Writ of Execution until the Writ of
Execution was served,
13

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment was denied on 7/8/09.

14

Defendant's appeal of that decision was submitted on 7/9/09.

15,

A Sheriffs sale insatisfactkm of the partial Judgment is scheduled for 11:00

AM of 7/10/09

REASONS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED
ARGUMENT I:
Defendant Seeks Sufficient Time To Capitalize A Bond For Satisfaction Or
Appeal
Defendant seeks 17 days to raise the capital for satisfaction of judgment or for
an appellate bond for a permanent stay of judgment pending appeal, hi the
meanwhile Defendant is willing to submit a bond to cover the inconvenience of 17
days delay in the Sheriffs sale. Defendant has sufficient assets to arrange for a full,
permanent bond to cover the Plaintiffs risk during appeal, but that process will take
about two weeks. Rather than lose the profit from a land development project into
which Defendant has expended considerable time and effort, defendant should be
allowed sufficient time to conduct his appeal or raise the money for satisfaction of
judgment
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ARGUMENT lit
Final Judgment In This Case Remains Subject To Defendant's Counterclaim,
Which Has Not Been Adjudged.
Defendant's coiinterclaim is still in effect. Thefinaljudgment in this case
should reflect an accurate accounting of the claims and damages to both patties
before assets of the partnership are liquidated. Wherefore* a final judgment in
inappropriate at this time and ejection should be delayed.
ARGUMENT HI
Execution of Judgment at this point in time
would contradict previous orders of this court.
Execution of Judgment at this point in time would contradict previous orders
of this court to maintain the partnership between the parties, which is based on the
ownership of properties sought to be sold for satisfaction of partial judgment,
In his Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Defendant's motion For Withdrawal and Amendment of Admissions
Judge Mower refiised to dissolve the partnership between Plaintiff and Defendant
The effect of the current Judgment, however, would dissolve that partnership by
alienating the subject of the partnership, to wit the land to be developed.
ARGUMENT IV
Aspects Of Judgment Are Subject To Defendant's Appeal
Some aspects of the judgment are subject to Defendant's appeal, to wit:
Attorney fees, value of property, and the proper application of interest to the
principle award These are easily demonstrable facts. It is an elemental miscarriage
ofjustice to base a decision on incorrect perceptions rather than take the time to
make a judgment based on the truth.
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ARGUMENT Vi
The Judgment Is Defective For Allowing Inaccurate Measure Of Damages
Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final
Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) for Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action asserts that
"the value of Lot 347 [sic] was not less than $27,000,00 as demonstrated in that
certain land appraisal report, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by reference". That "certain land appraisal report" purports to
establish the value of the property "as of 9-24-08".
The Judgment is defective for allowing an evaluational of damages as of
Plaintiffs appraisal, dated September 24*, 2008, which allows for measure of
damages as ascertained by the Judgment on December 8th, 2008, AND for "interest"
supposedly accruing over 8 years since January 10th, 2000, the date of the original
agreement.
There is no evaluation for the property at the time the original agreement was
signed from which interest may be accurately calculated. Plaintiff should not be
awarded the appreciated value of the assets in question plus interest based on this
value retroactively covering the duration of appreciation. To calculate interest
retroactively for eight years based on a 2008 appraisal, which includes appreciated
value, is improper and does a disservice to the interest of justice.
ARGUMENT VI*
Pursuant To Rules 6(b) And 60(b) Ut R. Civ. P. Defendant's Motion To Set
Aside Judgment And Quash Writ Of Execution May Be Considered Timely
This court upheld Plaintiffs claims that Defendant's Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and Quash Writ of Execution is not timely pursuant to the prescription of
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Rule 60(b) URCP that such motion is to be submitted within 3 months of entry of
Judgment.
However, Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Quash Writ of
Execution may be considered timely according to the court's discretion and good
cause pursuant to Rules 6(b) and 60(b) URCP.
Pursuant to Rules 6(b)(2) the Court may "upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rule... 60(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in
them,"
Rule 60(b) allows such exception where the court is not limited in its power
"to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding" notwithstanding the 3 month limit for such Motion prescribed earlier in
the Rule.
It remains a fact that Defendant was not informed of the proceedings against
him due to suspension of his lawyerfromthe practice of law. This motion continues
therefor to be timely made given Defendant's tardy notice of the Judgment via his
notice of the impending Sheriffs sale of the property in question.
CONCLUSION
Allowing this temporary stay of execution is in the best interests of justice
since it will allow a a just resolution without harm or risk to Plaintiff either by
satisfaction ofjudgment or a determination of the actual facts underlying Plaintiffs
judgment.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The District Court had and has the duty to prevent obvious and
preventable miscarriages of justice when the facts are easily adjudicatable.
discretion of court Defendant is entitled to that most basic right of due process: his
right to be heard in court before his property is taken from him.
Respectfully submitted this

day of July, 2009.

CERTTFICATE OF DELIVERY
DAY OF JULY, 20091 DID CAUSE
THIS IS TO CERTIFY ON THIS
TO BE FAXED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THIS MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY STAY OF EXECUTION TO THE OFFICE OF PAULM. KING,
HOOLE AND KING, L.C, AT (801) 272-7557.

Kent & Fillmore
Attorney for Defendant
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT
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2«WJUL 10 A«10»31»
PAUL M. KING (5500)
HOOLE & KING, L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone (801) 272-7556
Facsimile (801)272-7557
Email
paul.king@hooleking.Gom

Supplemental Affidavit Of Attorney's Fees and Costs to

VD29229508

Attorneys for Milce Meguerditchian
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050600136 SMITH,MAX

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT

MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO
AUGMENT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
The Smith Family Living Trust, u/a/d March
19,1991

Civil No. 050600136
Judge Marvin Bagley

Defendant.

The Plaintiff has incurred the following described additional attorney's fees and costs
subsequent to the entry ofjudgment in his favor. Pursuant to paragraph two of the Court's Judgment
entered in favor of the Plaintiff on or about December 8,2008, said judgment is augmented in the
amount of said fees.
In support of said fees and augmentation. Affiant states as follows;
1.

I am a duly licensed member of the Utah State Bar authorized to practice law in the

State of Utah andDigitized
an attorney
with the law firm of HOOLE & KING, L,C.
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2,

I have been responsible for the prosecution, of the above-entitled action for and on

behalf of Plaintiff, and am familiar with the nature and extent of legal services provided for the
Plaintiff and the legal fees billed to Plaintiff for said services.
3.

The law firm of HOOLE & KING, L.C. has provided not less than the following

services to Plaintiff during the period from the entry of judgment through Sheriffs Sale, July 10,
2009;
Date

Description

Duration/
Quantity

4/1/09

Research defendant's assets, prepare application for writ
of execution, writ of execution itself and praecipe,
Arrange for service on defendant,

3.5 hours

$787.50

5/1/09

Confer with sheriffs office regarding sale pursuant to
writ of execution.

.5 hours

$112,50 .

6/17/09 Telephone conference with judge regarding request for
hearing filed by defendant. Review file,

.5 hours

$ 112.50

6/25/09 Review opposing counsel's motion, prepare documents,
obtain same from title company, prepare memo in
opposition, deliver to opposing counsel. Travel to
Manti, argue motion.

12,5 hours $2,812.50

7/1/09

Review defendant's motion for enlargement of time to
file appraisal. Coordinate with opposing counsel's
office to obtain appraisal submitted.

.8 hours

$ 180.00

7/8/09

Prepare order denying defendant's motion to set aside
judgment and quash writ of execution. Prepare
supplemental affidavit of fees and costs,

1,5 hours

$337.50

7/8/09

Review appraisal submitted by defendant, research
qualifications of appraiser and assumptions in report.
Research caselaw regarding Rule 60(b) and related
matters. Prepare for telephone conference with court.
Participate in telephone hearing with court.

4.5 hours

$ 1,012,50

Judge Marvin Bacjley2 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
C i v i l No, 050600136
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of The Smith Family Living Trust,
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
CaseNo.20100850-CA
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Sheriffs Certificate of Sale
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WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO:
Mike Meguerdltchlan
P.O. Box 651

Salt Lake City, Utah 84166
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH SANPETE
COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT
—ooOoo—
MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
Plaintlff(s)'
vs.

CERTIFICATE OF SALE
Case No: 050600136

MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of The
Smith Family Living Trust, u/a/d/ March 19,1991
Defendant(s),
t«»>iBMMW"'^«^»nP'"m«^ii^iMhi"i»«iwiiii»iM»^i<Bi.t^

Mi'
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I, Robert Henningson, Deputy Sheriff of Sanpete County, do hereby certify
that I received the Writ of Execution, issued by the above-mentioned court, and by
virtue of the same, I did notioefor sale all rights, title and interest of the defendant(s) in
the following described property:

Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 31, Township 12 South, Range 4
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 88deg 59'57" East 1288:94 feet;
thence North 79deg56'18" East 710.82 feet; thence North 59deg13'01" East 819.26
feet; thence North 58deg52'40" East 428.89 feet; thence North 25deg47'50" East
129.558 feet; thence South 424,763 feet; thence South 60deg18'17" West 788.156
feet; thence South 79deg29'3l" West 504.635 feet; thence West 1935.19 feet to the
point of beginning.
Containing: 9.42 acres, more or less (S#20232Xi)
OakerHills Plat 4 (Phase IV) (Tax Serial #20221) more specifically described as:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section 30, Township 12 South, Range 4
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point of beginning being on Section Line and
being on the boundary line between Oaker Hills and Elk Ridge Subdivision; thence
South 89deg43'46" west 1642,58 feet'to the centerline of the Oaker Hills access road
and the following 14 courses; South 266,85 feet; thence
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Page 2
Certificate of Sale
•Meguerdltchlah vs. Smith

South 12deg56*35" East 282.88 feet; thence south 38deg25'13"East 274.87 feet;
thence South 44deg31'02" East 210.10 feet; thence South 70 deg 54'52" East 244.38
feet; thence South 63deg 38'47" East 237.37 feet; thence South 43 deg 36'34" East
204.14 feet; thenoe South 25 deg 21'18" East 209,58 feet; thence South 08 deg 56*10"
West 208.94 feet; thence South 32 deg 06'46" West 173.63 feet; thence South 75 deg
26'28" West 292.16 feet; thence North 89 deg 02'18" West 234.57 feet; thence South 48
deg 04'38" West 112.48 feet; thence South 26 deg 52'33" West 394.85 feet; thence
leaving said road centerline, South 61 deg 33'22" East 226.25 feet; thence South OOdeg
45'39" West 299,14 feet to a fence corner and sixteen (1/16) oorner; thence North
89deg 24'38" East 2615.95 feet; thence North 00 deg 00*36" East 2675.36 feet; thence
South 89 deg 43'47" West 1323,29 feet to the point of beginning.

Water Rights;
(1) All rights of the Defendants in water right number 51-224, and all other rights
" of the Defendants in water coming from and the well producing said water,
said to be located approximately North 950 feet East 300 feet from the
Southwest corner, Section 4 Township 12 South Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Basin Meridian.

(2) Other rights of the Defendants in water rights and/or interests in water wells
located in Sanpete County, Utah'.

By posting written notice of time, date- and place of sale and particularly
describing and posting said property twenty-one (21) days on the property to be sold at
the place of sale, th© Sanpete County Courthouse and three (3) public places in the
precinct where the property is located. Notice of Sale was also advertised in the
Sanpete Messenger for three (3) issues once a week for three (3) successive weeks
prior to the sale.
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.

MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of The Smith Family Living Trust,
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
CaseNo.20100850-CA
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DARWIN C. FISHER, #1080
A Professional Corporation
40 N, 300 Bast, Suite 101
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone No, (435)688-1170
Attorney for Defendant

Motion to Set Aside Sale
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"VD30417416
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pa9es: 2

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
MOTION TO SET ASIDE SALE
Plaintiff,

vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
the Smith Family Living Trust, n/a/d March
19,1991,

Civil No.: 050600136
Judge: David L. Mower

Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant Max Smith, individually and as Trustee of the Smith Family
Living Trust, and moves the Court for an order setting aside the sheriffs sale of 9.42 acres, Phase
IV of Oaker Hills, and all of water right number 51 -224.
This motion is based on Rule 69B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,. A Memorandum
in support of this Motion is filed herewith.
jrC
DATED this $ "day of December, 2009.

^

'*«<8$iXi;i:tXr.-i!:,M)iH4»,r,^

*">»«.
,^A

6teS3a^Va

DARWIN C, FISHER
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the fj

day of December, 2009,1 caused to be served by the method

indicated below a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing MOTION TO SET ASIDE
SALE to the following:

21

VIA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL

Paul M, King
HOOLE&KING,L,C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-2634'
Attorneys for Plaintiff
S

(
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A Professional Corporation
40.N. 300 East, Suite 101
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone No. (435) 688-1170
Attorney for Defendant

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Sale
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SET ASIDE SALE

Plaintiff,
vs.

MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
the Smith Family Living Trust, u/a/d March
19,1991,

Civil No,: 050600136
Judge: David L, Mower

Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant Max Smith, individually and as Trustee of the Smith Family
Living Trust, and submits this Memorandum in support of his Motion to set aside the sheriff s sale.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Mike Meguerditchian ("Meguerditchian") obtained judgment against Max Smith
("Smith") in the sum of $54,690.92. On July 7,2009, Plaintiff was the only bidder at the sheriffs
sale and purchased real property and water rights belonging to the Smith Family Trust.
The sale should be set aside because the officer conducting the sale sold more property and
water rights than necessary to satisfy the amount due.
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FACTS
1,

On December 8,2008, Merguerditchian obtained judgment against Smith in the sum

of $54,690,92. (Exhibit 1, Judgment)
2.

On May 19., 2009, Merguerditchian gave notice of sheriff s sale (Exhibit 2, Notice

of Sale,)
3',

The Notice of Sale provided that 9.42 acres, more or less, would be sold at the

sheriff s sale. (Exhibit 2 at p, 1.)
4.

The Notice of Sale further provides that Phase IV of Oaker Hills, containing

approximately 145 acres, would be sold, (Exhibit 2 at p. 1.)
5.

The Notice of .Sale also provided that water right number 51 -224 and all other rights

of Smith in water coming from and the well producing said water wouldbe sold at the sheriff s sale,
(Exhibit 2 at p. 2,)
6.

Lastly, the Notice of Sale provided that all other rights of the Defendant in water

rights and/or interests in water wells located in Sanpete County, Utah would be sold at the sheriffs
sale.. (Exhibit 2 at p. 2.)
7*

On July 7,2009, Merguerditchian was the only bidder on the property and obtained

title to the 9.42 acres, Phase IV of Oaker Hills, all of water right number 51 -224,
8,

The value of the 9,42 acres, the 155 acres of Oaker Hills Phase IV, and water right

number 51-224, is $505,000, (Exhibit 3, Appraisal, p, 1.)

2
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ARGUMENT
Rule 69B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides "The officer .shall sell only so
much property as is necessary to satisfy the amount due," The amount owed Merguerditchian is
the sum of $54,690.92. The value of the real property and water rights sold at the sheriffs sale is
$505,000. Since more real property and water rights were sold at the sheriffs- sale than was
necessary to satisfy the amount due Merguerditchian, the sale should be set aside.

fr^-DATED this jIL'day of December, 2009.
r

\..
-^•^..

DARWIN C. FISHER
Attorney for Plaintiffs

3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the £% day of December, 2009,1 caused to be served by the method
indicated below a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE SALE to the following:

^C

VIA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL

Paul M. King
HOOLE&KING.L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-2634
Attorneys for Plaintiff

c.
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of The Smith Family Living Trust,
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
CaseNo.20100850-CA

TAB 9
District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Sheriffs Sale
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT

2810SEP IS P M & O I

PAUL M. KING (5500)
HOOLE & KING, L.C,
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone
(801) 272-7556
Facsimile
(801) 272-7557
Email
pauLking@hooleldiig.com
Attorneys for Mike Meguerditchian
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT

MIKE MEGUERDITCHIAN, an individual,
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER, DENYING IN
PART AND GRANTING IN PART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE SHERIFF'S SALE

Plaintiffs,

vs.
MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of The Smith Family Living Trust, u/a/d
March 19, 1991
Defendant.

1

Civil No. 050600136
Judge Marvin Bagley

At ^hearing hqld before the above captioned court on the 9th day of July, 2010, beginning
at 10:00 a.m., all parties appearing through counsel, the Court having received the memoranda
of counsel and being fully advised of the premises, the Court heard oral argument concerning the
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff Sale previously conducted in this matter in execution
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of the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff previously rendered herein. Accordingly, as to the subject
Motion to Set Aside Sheriffs Sale, the Court makes the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
order set forth below,
A complete transcript of the Court's ruling made in Court at said date and time is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. A copy of the Certificate of Sale
issued by the Sanpete County Sheriffs Office, documenting the Sheriffs Sale which is the subject
of the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Sheriffs Sale, is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and
incorporated herein by this reference,

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The fair market value of the real property included in the Sheriffs Certificate of

Sale, consisting of two parcels of real property, items 1 and 2 in the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale,
tax parcels 20232X1 and 20221, respectively, is $505,000.00,
2.

All parties presented expert reports prepared by qualified appraisers, the Court

found both appraisers to be qualified and competent. The Court found that the appraiser and
expert report relied upon by the Defendant in this matter to be more compelling and more
accurately reflected the fair market value of the property, which was found to be $505,000.00 as
set forth above.
3.

The price bid at the Sheriffs Sale for the aforementioned two parcels of real

property, a total of $33,000,00, was found by the Court to be inadequate, and the difference
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between $33,000.00 bid and the $505,000.00 fair market value of the property found by the Court
shocks the conscience of the court.
4.

With regards to the water rights included in the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, being

items number .3 and 4 in said Certificate, water right number 51-224 and other un-named water
rights of the Defendants in Sanpete County, Utah, respectively, the Court found that the fair
market value of said water rights are $7,500.00 per acre foot,
5.

Without testimony of the exact number of acre feet of water owned by the

Defendant included in said Sheriff s, Certificate of Sale, the Court found that the Defendant's held
in excess of 20 acre feet of water subject to that certificate.
6.

Thebid amount for said water shares, being $30,000,00 and $3,000.00 respectively

for a total of $33,000,00, is less than the fair market value of said water shares' found by the
Court, to the extent that the Court found that price to be inadequate and that difference shocks the
conscience of the Court.
7.

The officer conducting the Sheriffs Sale, being unable to find sufficient personal

property, acted appropriately in selling real property of the Defendants listed in said Certificate
of Sale.
8.

The Court finds that there was nothing misleading regarding the sale of real

property included in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, and no unfairness in the conduct of the
purchasing party with respect to the two parcels real property included in said Certificate of Sale.
The Court found that there was nothing irregular in the sale of real property at said Sheriffs Sale,
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9..

The Court finds that the Notice of Sheriff s Sale described the first portion of water

rights as simply the rights to the Defendants in water right #51-224, however, the fact that several
of the rights included in said water right have been severed off and have individual water right
numbers made said description insufficient.
10.

The description of the second part of the water rights sold at said Sheriffs Sale

(item #4) was simply other water rights of the Defendant in Sanpete County, Utah.
11..

The Court finds that these descriptions of the water rights of the Defendants are

insufficient, leading to confusion,' which would have the effect of discouraging bidders at the sale
and which would have a direct effect of lowering the price at the Sheriffs Sale.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The proper standard for setting aside the Sheriff's Sale in this matter is that standard

outlined in Pyper v. Bond, 224 P.3d 713 (UtahAapp., 2009). The standard set out in that case is
that two elements must be satisfied; first there must be a gross inadequacy of the purchase price
as compared to value of the property sold; and second, there must be irregularities attending, the
sale, especially if the irregularities have a distinct tendency to prevent the realization of a fair price
for the property sold unless the complaining party is estopped by his or her own latches or failure
to act.
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2.

The purchase price for the two parcels of real property sold at the Sheriffs Sale,

was grossly inadequate, shocking the conscience of the Court meeting the first element required
by the Pyper v. Bond standard.
3.

There were no irregularities involving the sale of real property at the Sheriff's Sale,

therefore, the second element of the Pyper v. Bond standard is not met as it applies to the sale of
real property at the Sheriff's Sale,
4.

The purchase price for the sale of water rights was grossly inadequate, shocking

the conscience of the Court, and meeting the first element of the Pyper v. Bond case standard for
setting aside the Sheriffs Sale as it relates to said water rights.
5.

The Court rules as a matter of law that the water rights sold constituted real

property and were inadequately described in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale, Therefore, the Court
finds that there were irregularities attending the sale of water rights at the Sheriffs Sale, and both
elements of the Pyper v, Bond case standard were met as. they relate the to the sale of water rights
at the Sheriff s Sale..
6..

The Court rules that under Utah Code Aim, § 734-11, because the water rights sold

were not shares of stock in an irrigation company, the water rights constituted real, property not
personal property, and therefore were inadequately described as set forth above, because rule
69B(d) of the Ut. R< Civ. P. requires that parcels of real property be sold separately and be
described separately.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

ORDER
1.

The Sheriffs Sale of the two parcels of real property, being items one and two

listed in the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, parcels 202323X1 and 20221, at Sanpete County, Utah,
is affirmed. Defendants' Motion to Set Aside the Sheriffs Sale as to the parcels of real property
is denied.
2.

The Sheriff of Sanpete County,. Utah, is authorized to issue its final Sheriffs Deed

transferring both parcels of real property to the bidder at said Sheriffs Sale.
3.

Defendant's. Motion to Set Aside the Sheriffs Sale as it applies to the water rights

sold, items number three and four in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, being water right number
51-224 and all other water rights of the Defendants in Sanpete County Utah, is granted. The
Sheriffs Sale and the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale as it applies to said water rights only is hereby
set aside,
4r

The judgment in favor of the Plaintiff previously rendered herein remains

unsatisfied as to the $33,000.00 credit bid of the Plaintiff for the water rights purchased, which
purchase is set aside pursuant to this Order.
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING INPART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE SHERIFF'S SALE was mailed by first-class mail,
postage prepaid, on this $>

day of August, 2010 to the following:

Darwin C. Fisher
40 N. 300 East, Suite 101
St. George, UT 84770
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Meguerditchian v. Smith, et at
Case No. 050600136
Evidentiary Hearing - Defendants''Motion to Set Aside Sheriffs Sale
July 9, 2010
Transcript of Judge's Ruling
From recording made at hearing by court personnel;
Transcript prepared by the staff of Hoole & King, L, C.

Judge:

We are back on the record in Meguerditchian versus Smith case 050600136. I've
gone back and reviewed my notes and looked up some provisions of the law and have
this decision.
This case is. here on a Motion to Set Aside a Sheriffs Sale following -entry- of a
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff against the Defendant* The proper standard for
setting aside a Sheriffs Sale is what's outlined in the Pyper case and as I interpret the
Pyper decision requirement. First there must be a gross inadequacy of the purchase
price as compared to the value of the property being sold, and there must be
irregularities attending the sale. And especially if the irregularities have a distinct
tendency to prevent the realization of a fair price for the property sold unless the
complaining party is estopped by his or her own laches or failure to act.
In this case, I find that there were two parcels of ground, real property, that were sold.
One 9,42 acres that sold for $3,000.00-, one 155 acre parcel that sold for $30,000.00.
There were also rights that were...water rights that were sold as defined as rights in
water right 51-224 that sold for $30,000.00, and $3,000,00 for other rights in
San,.,other water rights in Sanpete County.
Ifindthat the fair market.. .well as to thefair market value of the land, there were two
appraisals, Mr. Kjar, Kjar testified that the property was worth $151,000.00 and he
included enough water for essentially one, one residence. Ms. Deiibow testified that
her value was $505,000,00 without water. Mr, Kjar appraised the pasture as ag-land,
or excuse me, he appraised the property equivalent as a pasture with ag-land and Ms.
Denbow appraised as property with the potential for development, Ifindthat both
appraisers are credible, that both appraisers are qualified and that I accept the
appraisals based upon both appraisers. I find that they were both correct, however,
they both appraised it differently.
Ms, Denbow appraised on a highest and best use of a potential for development. Mr.
Kjar appraised it as, just raw land. And so I believe the issue before me is what is the
highest and best use of the property so I that I know which appraisal to accept. I find
that the highest and best use of the property is as it was appraised by Ms, Denbow.
The reason Ifindthat is because it was partially developed, there was some testimony
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that there had been up to $200,000.00 of development costs already into it, that there
are roads and other improvements. I also find that the parties are in the subdivision
business, that they have been developing subdivisions in the area for some time, that
they got preliminary approval for the larger parcel as to phase 4 of a subdivision, that
it was their clear intent that that what they intended to do with the property, and that
the property was not being used as ag-land, it was not on the green belt, that is was
there in the process of being developed. So Ifindthat the property does have a fair
market value without water of $505,000,00, The bid price for that ground was
$33,000.00.. I find that the difference between $33,000,00 and $505,000.00 is
inadequate* it's a sufficient difference to shock the conscience, particularly when you
consider thepotential value if this subdivision was completed, Ms, Denbow testified
that she did not value,, did not appraise the property as a completed subdivision but
only as a something with the potential And so if it is completed, and there was some
testimony that it could be completed with as little as $10,000.00 more dollars;
however, there is still not approval and there are a lot of "if s", I just find that given
all the facts before me, all the evidence that I have heard,, that $33,000.00 for
$505,000.00 worth of property is too inadequate and it shocks my conscience.
With regard to the water rights, they sold for a total of $33,000,00, The
evidence that I have is that they water rights are valued at $7,500,00 per acre foot, I
accept that because that is the evidence before me. However, I actually believe and
firmly believe that that is undervalued based on judicial notice of other cases that I
am familiar with, When, when those acre feet of water are divided into ,25, which
they are in this case, it is an indication that there is .25 acre foot per future building
lot and so that I think that they usually sale for four times that amount. $7,500,00
would be the price for .25 acre feet of water for an individual lot. However that is.
not the evidence before me but I still believe andfirmlybelieve that's tree, We don't
have a firm number of shares but there are in excess of 20 shares based on the
evidence that before me. Unless that I find the value of the water shares is also in
excess of what the price brought and it is also is inadequate and shocks the
conscience as well.
With regard to prong number 2, that there has to be,,,when one prong is not
sufficient there has to be a satisfaction of both prongs. There has to be alleged
irregularities or there has-to be irregularities in the sale, Thefirstallegation is that the
personal property should have been sold first. Under Rule 69 A(a), the law requires
a seizure of property before the sale. Under that rule, the Sheriff is, or whoever is
doing the seizing, is required to seize the personal propertyfirstand then if sufficient
personal property can not be found, then to seize the real property. The only
testimony that I have as to what the sheriff did in seizing the properly was he said he
didn't have sufficient information to know that the property was. There weren't
numbers provided and there was no evidence that he didn't do his job, there was no
evidence that he didn't act in good faith, So I find that the officer acted
appropriately, Ifindthat he couldn't find sufficient personal property, so seizing on
the real property was sufficient, Now I realize that there is a lot of hand-holding that
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goes on when a sheriff is asked to seize property, but usually in my experience there
is not enough hand-holding. It should be the responsibility of the lawyers to dot all
the 'i's" and cross all the "fs". Whenever, in my practice as lawyer, if I everhad a
sheriffs sale and seizure, I would make all the arrangements, Don't leave anything
up to the sheriffs office.. You arrange for storage, you arrange for what is to be
picked up and numbered and for whatever reason, that wasn't clone, and I don't, I
don't fault the Sheriff in this case and I dofindthat he was unable to find sufficient
personal property and so the seizure of the real property was appropriate.
Also there was contradictory evidence as to ownership of the tractor and the
brush hog and really no value as to any other specific item of, of personal property.
With regard to the real property, there were two descriptions, one of the smaller
parcel and one of the larger parcel. The larger parcel was described...well both of
them were.described in metes and bounds but in addition the larger parcel, parcel was
described as Phase 4 of Oakerhills Plat 4. I find that there was nothing misleading
•about that, I could notfindany unfairness in the conduct of the purchasing party with
respect to the two parcels of real property. I didn't find anything that was irregular
in that sale. With regard to the sale of the water-rights, I do find that there were
irregularities,. Rule 69B(d) requires that severable lots of real property be sold
separately, Also Rule 69B(b)(3) requires that the notice of sale contain a particular
description of real property to be sold. Ifindthat the notice in this case did not give
a particular description. It was described as all rights of Defendants in water right
51-224; however, the evidence before me is that several of those rights have been
severed off and have their individual water rights numbers. I alsofindthat the other
description of the other waters was other water of the Defendants in Sanpete County.
That is just an insufficient description, I think it leads to confusion and would have
a effect of discouraging bidders at the sale which would have a direct effect of
lowering the price.
Exhibit 6 shows several different water numbers of water rights; however,
part of the them are, or all of them were originally severed from 51-224, plus I that
think the description was misleading and was insufficient and did not describe the
water separately, Ifindthat the water rights are real property. Section 73 -1 -11 Utah
Code Annotated distinguishes between shares of stock in an irrigation company,
which my understanding of Utah law is those are personal rights as to other water
rights, which are not shares of stock in an irrigation company. I know that there has
been, theUtah law...went, there were different cases several years ago, I believe that
the most recent Utah Supreme Court case, and I believe that the legislature resolved
that a few years ago. And water rights that are not in an irrigation company are real
property, water rights in an irrigation company are personal property, The rights in
this case are not shares of stock in an irrigation company so Ifindthat they are real
property.. Also, water rights, such as these are transferred by Warranty Deed, they are
also recorded in the Office of the State Engineer, but there is also a requirement that
there be a backup of a conveyance, document, which usually is in the form of a
Warranty Deed. I believe that is the law in the State of Utah, and if its not, if I am
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wrong on that, in this case I believe that it is- appropriate because the water rights in
this case are sufficiently closer to being real property than they arepersonal property,
• and as such I believe that Rule 69B(d) requires that they be sold separately and
described separately.
In addition I think the sale of the water rights is, just smacks of unfairness,
I think $7,500 per acre foot is very low compared to if they are divided into .25 acre
feet and sold for individual lots, Also, I think it was unfair by the way that the water
rights were described, appears to smack of unfairness.
So in this case I set aside the Sheriffs Sale as it relates to the sale of the water
rights. I do not set aside the sale as it relates to the ground. Their still remains a
. portion of the judgment outstanding that is not paid, and the Defendant is still the
record title owner of the water rights, I do not extend the redemption period because
that was not what was requested in the motion, but the request was to set aside the
sale. That's my decision, Neitherparty prevailed outright, and the rule requires that
I request the prevailing party to prepare the order, I think that neither party is the
prevailing party so I am going to ask counsel who wants to volunteer to prepare the
order,
Fisher:

I'll do it.

Judge:

Alright, Mr, Fisher, I order you to prepare the order. I think that the case. was. well
tried, I appreciate the courtesy of counsel and their preparation and that's my Order.
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MIKE MEGUERDITCH1AN, an individual,
Plaintiffs) •
vs.

CERTIFICATE OF SALE .
Case No: 050600136

MAX SMITH, individually and as Trustee of The
Smith Family Living Trust, u/a/d/ March 19,1991
Defendant(s),

I, Robert Henningson, Deputy Sheriff of Sanpete County, do hereby certify
that I received the Writ of Execution, issued by the above-mentioned court, and by
virtue of the same, I did notice for sale all rights, title and interest of the defendant® in
the following described property:
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 31, Township 12 South, Range 4
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 88deg 59'57" East ,1288/94 feet;
thence North 79deg56'18* East 710.82 feet; thence North 59deg13'01" East 819.26
f e W h e h c e North' 58deg'52'40" East 428.89 feet; thence North 25deg47'5'0" East
129.558 feet; thence South 424.763 feet; thehce South 60deg18'17" West 788.156
.feet; thence South 79deg29'31" West 504.635 feet; thence West 1935.19 feet to the
point of beginning.
Containing: 9.42 acres, more or less ($#20232X1)
OakerHills Plat 4 (Phase IV) (Tax Serial #20221) more specifically described as:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section 30, Township 12 South, Range 4
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point of beginning being, on Secti.<5nsLine and
being on the boundary line between Oaker Hills and Elk Ridge Subdivision; thence
South 89deg43'46" west 1642.58 feet to the centerllne of the Oaker Hills access road
and the following 14 courses; South 266.85 feet; thence
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South 12deg56'35" East 282,88 feet; thence south 38deg25'13" East 274.87 feet;
thence South 44deg31'02'* East 210.10 feet; thence South 70 deg 54'52" East 244.38
feet; thence South 63deg 38'47" East 237.37 feet; thence South 43 deg 36'34" East •
204.14 feet; thence South 25 deg 21'18" East 209.58 feet; thence South 08 deg 56'10*
West 208.94 feet; thence South 32 deg 06'46" West 173:63 feet; thence South 75 deg
26'28" West 292.16 feet; thence North 89 deg 02'18" West 234.57 feet; thence South 48
deg 04'38" West 112.48 feet; thence South 26 deg 52'33" West 394.85 feet; thence
leaving said road centerline, South 61. deg 33'22" East 226.25 feet; thence South OOdeg
45'39" West 299.14 feet to a fence corner and sixteen (1/T6) corner; thence North
89deg 24'38" East 2615,95 feet; thence North 00 deg 00'36" East 2675.36 feet; thence
South 89 deg 43'47" West 1323.29 feet to the point of beginning.

Water Rights:
(1) All rights of the Defendants in water right number 51-224, and all other rights
of the Defendants in water coming from and the well producing said water,
said to be located approximately North 950 feet East 300 feet from the
Southwest corner, Section 4 Township 12 South Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Basin Meridian.

(2) Other rights of the Defendants in water rights and/or interests in water wells
located in Sanpete County, Utah. •

By posting written notice of time, date and place of sale and particularly
describing and posting said property twenty-one (21) days on the property to be sold at
the place of sale, the Sanpete County Courthouse and three (3) public places in the
precinct where the property is located. Notice of Sale was also advertised in the
Sanpete Messenger for three (3) issues once a week for three (3) successive weeks
prior to the sale.
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On the 10th day of July, 2009 at the Sanpete County Courthouse, 160 North
Main Manti, Utah at the hour of 11:00 a.m. I did sell the interest of Max Smith,
individually and'as Trustee of The Smith Family Living Trust, u/a/d March 19,1991 to
Mike Meguerditchian. Paul M. King, counsel of record for and in behalf of Mike
Meguerditchian placed the highest and only bid, a credit bid in the amount of
$66,000.00. There were four items offered for sale, those being listed in order as they
appear on. the "Notice of Sale".
item #1 was sold on Credit Bid for $ 3,000,00
Item #2 was sold on Credit Bid for $30,000.00
Item #3 was sold on Credit Bid for $30,000.00
item #4 was sold on Credit Bid for $ 3,000,00
Sale of real property is subject to redemption as provided for by law.
Dated at Manti, Sanpete County, State of Utah this 15th day of July, 2009.

Deputy Robert Henningsor
Civil Division
On the 15th day of July 2009 personally appeared before me, Deputy Robert
Hennlngson, the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

"DAW L Mrh

Notary Public
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DEBBIE L HATCH
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160 NORTH MAIN

wv-nMMANTI, UT WHS
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